Abstract. Th is paper recognizes a specifi c correspondence between biological evolution and technological development and on this basis tries to set up a semiotic approach to the evolutionary phenomenon of exaptation. To do this, the existence of a historical-structural and pragmatic analogy between organs and tools is shown, which in turn implies on a communicative ground the dissolution of some of their traditional distinctive att ributes. Finally, a philosophical-analytical approach to natural and cultural functions is applied to defi ne three types of exaptations.
Introduction
For Stephen Jay Gould and Elizabeth Vrba the notion of exaptation defi nes those biological traits that "are fi t for their current role, hence aptus, but they were not designed for it, and are therefore not ad aptus, or pushed towards fi tness. Th ey owe their fi tness to features present for other reasons, and are therefore fi t (aptus) by reason of (ex) their form, or ex aptus" (Gould, Vrba 1982: 6) . As a classic example, birds do not have feathers because they were originally designed to perform the function of fl ight, rather they were co-opted from the original use they had in dinosaurs, where they served as means of thermoregulation.
Since the concept was proposed as a response to the predominance of adaptation in the neo-Darwinian paradigm for evolutionary change, this article follows the same critical approach and the theoretical framework of reference adopted to address its analysis is the research program of biosemiotics, namely a semiotic science whose paramount heuristic principle consists in the view that a sign-based modelling of living organism can provide a bett er understanding than traditional (physicalist or neo-Darwinian) approaches within mainstream biology (Kull et al. 2008) .
Th is said, what would it mean to work out a (bio)semiotic model of exaptation? On one side, a model is a "form of meaning" that stands for something else (Sebeok, Danesi 2000: 2) , namely a system of ordered elements conveying some kind of information about a specifi c reality; on the other side, by being "a trait […] that confers performance advantage in a particular way at a specifi c time but was not produced by natural selection for that use" (Arnold 1994: 126 ; emphasis mine), exaptation covers a specifi c subset of instances of functional change in the relational properties of a character. Hence, a semiotic account of exaptation is based on the schematic representation (Krampen 1997: 248) of the factors involved in the nonselective and non-adaptive (in Gould and Vrba's sense) evolutionary generation of new connections within the organism-environment dynamics.
Th is project is grounded on the idea of an analogy between diff erent objects of analysis: in order to take a model developed within a specifi c discipline -semioticsand exploit it in a diff erent one -biology -the existence of common features between their respective domains must be assumed preliminarily. When it comes to exaptation, a commonsensical assimilatory comparison is oft en advanced to illustrate what the shift in the performance of a biological structure might look like; at the end of the exposition it will appear clear how deep and striking this insight is and its value in the detection and adoption of a concrete model.
In his study on the evolution of complex organs, and to facilitate the reader's understanding, T. Ryan Gregory (2008) draws a parallel between the mechanism of biological functional shift and the way a common everyday object -a coin -has been given a new use in recent years. If the primary function of a coin was and still is as currency, the appearance of a new conditioning situation (lott ery tickets covered by removable coating) has turned it into a lott ery tickets scraper as well. Moreover, because of the diffi culty to scratch just by holding it between the thumb and index fi nger, the coin has being integrated in a keychain that ensures a bett er grip. Th is exemplifi cation is remarkable in two ways.
First of all, it allows of a handy and concrete translation of Edwin Nicholas Arnold's conceptual terminology adopted in his important contribution (Arnold 1994) on exaptation. With this term he refers to traits that "arose in some other way, and only subsequently acquired the performance advantage and use under consideration, usually as a result of change in the selective regime" (Arnold 1994: 126) . Similarly, some properties of the coin, including the abrasive nature of its edges, had not been conceived to perform the scraping function, but the interest in this function is what became relevant additionally as soon as they were diff erently exploited in a new context. Besides, Arnold articulates diff erent kinds of exaptations: fi rst use exaptations, where "a trait has no performance advantage at its origin, gaining one only when subsequently coopted to the use in question" (Arnold 1994: 137) ; extra-use exaptations (the trait is already performing a function before change), divided into addition exaptations, "when the new use is merely added to the fi rst" (Arnold 1994: 138) , and transfer exaptations, "involving a shift to a new use with loss of the original one" (Arnold 1994: 138) . Back to Gregory's example, before becoming useful in the construction of human tools, metal (which also coins are made of) had not had any peculiar workable function and only later was recruited for currency exchange. All the same, its scratching use in the form of a coin is an additional function that by no means substitutes its monetary value. Th e choice of the coin is particularly interesting because, as for the material employed, it presupposes the succession of three historical moments: tool production, monetary value (maintaining that currency and work instruments are diff erent kinds of tools) and scraping utility. And such alternate phases characterize exaptation as well.
Coming to the second benefi t of Gregory's example, it off ers the opportunity to highlight two other important points made by Arnold. In the fi rst instance, "although the evolutionary role of fi rst-use exaptations has been emphasized […] these appear to be relatively rare.
[…] Extra-use exaptations, on the other hand, seem to be far more common…they may be a more immediately eff ective source of aptations in many situations than adaptations" (Arnold 1994: 144) . In the second instance, "[f]eatures of organisms that become exaptations are oft en quite complex and have not arisen from a single evolutionary event. Not infrequently, they are the result of a series of likely adaptations oft en widely separated in time" (Arnold 1994: 137) , which has to be interpreted not only singularly, in the sense of multiple functional shift s and adaptive refi nements of a single trait, but also collectively, since its cooption can be caused by an ensemble of elements that all together perform a defi nite function, as in the case of the eye described by Gregory (2008: 372) . Th at is, sometimes "existing components, be they functional for something else or nonfunctional initially, are brought together or rearranged to form a new, more complex combination with a novel function" (Gregory 2008: 364) . Th is is another way to say that the performance of a trait is a systemic property depending on the whole (in which it happens to become a part), where the requirements demanded by the general function of the latt er specify the particular usefulness of the former.
Extra-usage and complexity are also key features of technology production and tools manufacturing closely resembles the occurrence of some exaptations: the coin was already at hand before being exploited for a new use and the innovative functions was what caused the recruitment of the keychain, which before had never meant to be a coin-holder. Th e following quotation by Deborah A. McLennan suitably summarizes this general idea of a resemblance between the way instruments are assembled and the evolutionary process by which nature produces some of its creations:
Th e co-option of traits to serve new functions is not a diffi cult concept to understand. In fact, we ourselves do it all the time [...] . We are forever fi nding new functions for old devices, using an old boot as a planter, a fi shing rod to fl y a kite, a magnifying glass to start a fi re, a shell as currency, a berry or a root to dye cloth. Th e only diff erence between human and evolutionary co-option is that we purposefully change an object's function, while evolution simply takes advantage of an opportunity with no direction, purpose, or forethought. (McLennan 2008: 257) Th is analogy places itself within a complex multidisciplinary context where similar unitary interpretations of seemingly diff erent phenomena have already been suggested. Th erefore, before moving on, a brief outline of the background panorama from which it stands out is needed; moreover, this sketch will clarify with more precision the specifi c contribution made by my research.
Th e current topic is part of a wider debate on the parallelism between biology and culture and, strictly related, between biological and cultural evolution. With respect to the latt er there are as many subcategories of development -and accordingly as many analogies to the organic evolutionary process -as there are distinct interconnected subsystems that make up culture itself, such as for instance scientifi c progress, conceptual turn, language change and technological innovation. Besides, an appropriate typology of these possible interactions should carry out a whole series of distinctions: between the source and target spheres of assimilative interpretation; whether the comparison has to be understood literally or just hints to an analogy; whether it concerns the functional status of the elements at stake or just their development; eventually, it should take into account possible mutual interactions within the cultural sphere in general.
As a fi rst qualifi cation, my reasoning focuses its att ention on the affi nities detectable between biological evolution and technological innovation, with three distinctive points: fi rstly, it interprets the former on the basis of the latt er; secondly, it is limited to the recognition of an analogy between the two spheres; thirdly, it splits the comparison up into a twofold similarity concerning the constitution and function of organs and tools.
As a second qualifi cation, it adopts what it is generally considered and defi ned as a post-Darwinian approach, since it places adaptation by means of natural selection side by side with complementary processes eliciting micro-and macroevolutionary transformations. In this way, it anticipates and possibly counters one probable objection: if technological innovations fall under the rubric of nonrandom intelligent design, how can they be compared to a process triggered by casual variations? Th e existence and description of mechanisms of evolution both escaping the paradigmatic neo-Darwinian sequence (chance variation, inheritance, diff erential reproduction and adaptation) and implying the evolutionary eff ectiveness of the environmental responsiveness of organisms provide a more suitable biological-theoretical background for the analogy to be drawn. In this respect, Hoff meyer (1996, 2008) , Hoff meyer, Kull (2003) , Markoš (2002) , Markoš et al. (2009) and Kull (1998; 1999; are essential references to frame the issue. Besides, an extensive work thereupon is provided by West-Eberhard (2003) .
Such a tension between neo-and post-Darwinism can already be sensed within existing refl ections. Th e idea that new technologies arise as a result of variations of old ones and selective pressure against their diverse eff ectiveness, so as to yield diff erential spreading, is supported for instance by Basalla (1988) and Constant (1980) (further references for a Darwinian approach are: Gilfi llan 1935 ; Mokyr 1990; Saviott i, Metcalfe 1991; Metcalfe 1998) . However, Arthur (2007; 2009 ) is more relevant here, since he agrees only in part with these interpretations and introduces a key distinction: "I do not want to dismiss variation and selection in technology.
[…] But when we face the key question of how radically novel technologies originate […] we get stymied. Darwin's mechanism does not work" (Arthur 2009: 18) . Besides, as for the introduction of novel solutions, he detects a mechanism quite similar to exaptation: "Th is lock-in of an older successful principle causes a phenomenon I will call adaptive stretch. When a new circumstance comes along or a demand for a diff erent sphere of application arrives, it is easier to reach for the old technology -the old base principle -and adapt it by "stretching" it to cover the new circumstances" (Arthur 2009: 140) . Scholars who have focused expressly on framing and modelling technical progress from the viewpoint of an exaptationbased evolutionary theory are Allen and Andriani (2007) and Catt ani (2005) .
As a third qualifi cation, my approach stands in continuity with previous linguistic and semiotic interpretations of technological change. For Arthur (2009: 76) a "domain" or body of technologies "forms a language; and a new technological artifact constructed from components of the domain is an utt erance in the domain's language.
[…] the key activity in technology -engineering design -is a form of composition. It is expression within a language (or several)". Since the domain/ artefact distinction resembles the langue/parole opposition, technology appears as a system whose single concretizations obey its grammatical rules of combination (Arthur 2009: 77) . Similarly, Lotman (1991) takes a semiotic perspective on the issue and his contextualization of technological progress within culture theory and semiotics of cultural points indirectly to a biosemiotic interpretation as well, by virtue of the well acknowledged analogy between the notions of biosphere and semiosphere (see for instance Markoš 2004; Kotov, Kull 2011; Lotman 2005) . Finally, Innis (2009) claims for the application of diff erent semiotic conceptual tools and frameworks -Jakob von Uexküll's biologically based theory of meaning, Charles Sanders Peirce's typology of signs, Ferdinand de Saussure's model of language as a dynamic system of diff erences and Ernst Cassirer's model based on the triadic schematization of the forms of sense -to highlight quite diff erent, but nevertheless complementary, features of technology.
The analogy of production
In order to develop the argument, this section is providing some defi nitions of technology and taking into account, as concrete examples of comparison, a light bulb on one side and the case study of exaptation described by Gregory -the evolution of the eye -on the other side. Th e central idea can be summarized as follows: instruments and organs are similar in the way they are produced by, respectively, man and nature.
Firstly, since designed as a tool to satisfy or support human intentions, "[a] technology fulfi lls some expressed purpose -some need -personally or socially perceived" (Arthur 2007: 278 ; my emphasis): a technological artifact, or, bett er, its process of realization, always proceeds from a need and ends up fi nding a solution for a problem. It does not matt er whether it is the case of a new economic chance or an emerging market to be exploited: a requirement and its fulfi llment are always at stake. Th is clearly holds for the light bulb: thanks to the progress in the knowledge of electric phenomena, man was able to get rid of previous constraints (day-night alternation and usage of oil lamps) and secure a stable and versatile source of artifi cial light for daily activities. But a similar reasoning can be applied to the eye as well: once appeared in the form of simple photo-pigment, it increasingly enabled its carriers to bett er fulfi ll their needs for food identifi cation, locomotion, predator avoidance, and so forth. Hence, both historical processes can be classifi ed as problem-solving situations, which can be addressed with or without the participation of anticipatory intentionality.
Secondly, " [a] technology is built always around the reliable exploitation of some base phenomenon as envisaged through some principle of use" (Arthur 2007: 278) , that is, technological artifacts are based upon one or more natural eff ects, whether they be chemical, physical, magnetic or electrical. As for the incandescent light bulb, among various phenomena it harnesses the (physical) Joule eff ect, concerning the ratio between the intensity of current fl ow through a conductor and the heat generated, and the (chemical) property of argon gas to be inert, namely not to take part in the reactions occurring in the same environment where it is. But the same is also true of the eye and several interconnected facts are required for its functioning: the property of a molecule (chromophore) to change its physical conformation when interacting with light; the involvement of a protein (opsin) "in the chemical cascade that transduces the incoming light to an electrical signal" (Gregory 2008: 372) ; the convergence of light rays towards the photoreceptors, which is accomplished by exploiting their refracting and refl ecting capacity; and so on. As before, natural organs and artifi cial instruments can be categorized together as solutions to problems that both take advantage of one or several natural phenomena.
Th irdly, "[a] technology requires other sub-principles (and therefore subcomponents) for its practical working. It consists of components that are themselves technologies […] the whole arranged in a recursive hierarchy" (Arthur 2007: 278) . On one side, the already existing components are thought of as functionalities, namely "generic actions or operations that lie at hand" (Arthur 2007: 283 ; emphasis mine); on the other side, they enter as building blocks in to a combinatorial procedure. Hence, "we think of new technologies […] as combination of existing technologies possibly going on to become building blocks for future descendant technologies" (Arthur 2007: 284; emphasis mine) .
Looking at the elements that make up the light bulb, before this particular application the glass had always been used as a means to fulfi ll other needs thanks to its optic and chemical natural properties; as such, it was a previous existing technology in respect to its following adaptation to the function of gas container. Th e same holds for the wires employed to transport the current fl ux or the screw shape of the bulb base: before their recruitment, both were there for other reasons. Above all, the respective functional shift s occurred by means of their recombination in a new ensemble, so that what was actually new in the invention of incandescence light bulb was the arrangement of components and their relations.
Th e evolution of the eye can be described in the same technological terms, namely as the manifold re-functionalization of previously used elements. For instance, the fi rst photo-pigment arose from the combination of two preexisting molecules (retinal and opsin) that, in addition to the eye, can be found elsewhere in the organism and serve several non-visual functions: they "predate the origin of vision, and their merger and subsequent specialization in visual systems represents an important example of evolution through collage, exaptation, and secondary adaptation" (Gregory 2008: 372) . All the same, refractive proteins (crystallins) located in the lenses "are not only similar but identical to proteins that serve other functions in the eye and elsewhere in the body" (Gregory 2008: 376) and became co-opted and refi ned for the new role in association with photoreceptors, to which they had now to redirect and focus sunlight.
On this basis, it is possible again to associate organic and artifi cial objects and link them in this case to the concept of combination: the reuse of the old can happen in isolation, but it oft en involves the assembly of many elements, each of them solving a 'minor' sub-problem in a parts-whole recursive way, functional to the overall systemic working.
Before turning to the next analogy, a fi nal comment is necessary on Arthur's reasoning about the diff erences between technological and biological evolution. While critically discussing the assumption that a novel technology might arise from a process of variation and selection of old technologies, Arthur stresses that "[t]his idea has a certain Darwinian appeal, and it has validity with respect to improvements in technology. But it does not hold up for what interests us here: radical invention by deliberate human design" (Arthur 2007: 275 ; emphasis mine). Since they are thought of as complementary phenomena -"while I talk here about the creation of radically novel technologies, I recognize that the step-by-step improvement of existing technologies is economically just as important" (Arthur 2007: 276) the main problem regards their distinction: "[w]hat, in our context, allows one new technology to qualify as radically novel, and relegates another to be a mere improvement on or variation of some standard design?" (Arthur 2007: 277) . Th e answer is the following: "I will therefore defi ne a new (radically novel) technology as one that achieves a purpose by using a new or diff erent base principle than used before" (Arthur 2007: 278) .
However, from a post-Darwinian viewpoint, Arthur's idea of a "Darwinian appeal" insofar the perfecting of existing technologies is concerned is half true and betrays a partial consideration of the biological evolutionary process. Small, continuous and inheritable chance variations of a functional trait and its bett er adaptation to the environment by means of natural selection are but one way through which evolution acts to transform species. Exaptive phenomena prove that relatively radical novelties do occur in nature and therefore the complementarity of re-functionalization and improvement, ascribed by Arthur just to technological development, can be extended to the organic domain as well. Going back to the eye, once crystallins became coopted to perform the new function of refraction in association with photoreceptors, then there occurred a "[g]radual evolution of lens crystallin concentrations resulting in evolution of graded refractive index lenses in aquatic animals" (Gregory 2008: 374) . Just as the diff erent level of effi ciency between ancient and contemporary forms of light bulbs, so in biological history "any coopted structure (an exaptation) will probably not arise perfected for its new eff ect. It will therefore develop secondary adaptations for the new role" (Gould, Vrba 1982: 12) .
The pragmatic analogy
Along with the acknowledgement that complex organic units and instrumental artifacts come into existence following a common historical path of production, the previous section has also implicitly shown that, beyond the specifi c function to be executed, they both represent at large forms of action and mediation characterizing the relationship with the environment. In order to bett er understand the nature of this common performance, special att ention can be paid to a curious coincidence in the history of ideas: when it comes to the issue of identifying and explaining the main features of human perception, diff erent thinkers resort to a comparison with the situation of the blind man and his aid stick. Take for instance Descartes and his famous passages from the Dioptrics:
By means of his stick a blind man observes diff erences between trees, stones, water, and so on, apparently just as great as those between red, yellow, green and other colors, and […] there is nothing in these various bodies to make the diff erences except their diff erent ways of moving the stick or resisting its movements. (Descartes 1971 (Descartes [1637 : 241-242) When our blind man [holding two sticks and crossing them in front of him, the contact point being E] […] turns his hand A towards E, or again his hand C towards E, the nerves inserted in the hand cause a change in his brain, and this enables his soul to know not only the places A or C, but also any other places lying on the straight line AE or CE.
[…] Similarly, when our eye or head is turned in a given direction, our soul is made aware of it by the change in the brain that is produced by the nerves inserted in the muscles that execute the movement. (Descartes 1971 (Descartes [1637 Or consider Donald T. Campbell's quotation, always in a context of analysis focused on visual perception:
Blind locomotor search is the more primary, the more direct exploration. A blind man's cane is a vicarious search process. Th e less expensive cane movements substitute for blind trials and wasted movements by the whole body, removing costly search from the full locomotor eff ort […] . Th e substitutability of cane locomotion for body locomotion, the equivalence of opaque-to-cane and opaque-to-body, is a contingent discovery, although one which seems more nearly "entailed", or to involve a less complex, a less presumptive model of the physical world than does the substitutability of light waves or radar waves for body locomotion. (Campbell 1987 (Campbell [1974 Th is is instead how Maurice Merleau-Ponty (2005 [1945 : 165-166) uses the same example while addressing the psychological issue of habit:
Th e blind man's stick has ceased to be an object for him, and is no longer perceived for itself; its point has become an area of sensitivity, extending the scope and active radius of touch, and providing a parallel to sight.
[…] Th e position of things is immediately given through the extent of the reach which carries him to it, which comprises besides the arm's own reach the stick's range of action. If I want to get used to a stick, I try it by touching a few things with it, and eventually I have it 'well in hand', I can see what things are 'within reach' or out of reach of my stick.
[…] To get used to a hat, a car or a stick is to be transplanted into them, or conversely, to incorporate them into the bulk of our own body. Habit expresses our power of dilating our being-in-the-world, or changing our existence by appropriating fresh instruments.
Again, while questioning the inside/outside physical dichotomy with respect to a communication system, Gregory Bateson (2000 Bateson ( [1972 : 251) claims the following:
It is not communicationally meaningful to ask whether the blind man's stick or the scientist's microscope are "parts" of the man who uses them. Both stick and microscope are important pathways of communication and, as such, are parts of the network in which we are interested; but no boundary line -e.g., halfway up the stick -can be relevant in a description of the topology of this net.
Finally, a passage taken from Michael Kubovy (1988: 152 ; emphasis mine) makes explicit the kernel of the whole issue:
If you are walking in the dark feeling your way about with a cane, you are unaware of the pressure of the cane on the palm of your hand; all your att ention is focused on the nature of the obstacles revealed by the of the cane. Under these circumstances, if you had to classify the cane as part of the world or part of your body, you would most likely say that it was part of your body. Th is is true of all tools.
On one side, the fi rst two quotations suggest the possibility of replacing our organs with vicarious technologies, but two diff erent things can be substituted one for the other if they fulfi ll the same needs and their functions get enough closer so as to allow them to perform more or less identical actions in respect to the environment. On the other side, the last three quotations point to the meaninglessness of such distinctions as in/out and organic/inorganic, which lose value exactly when the pragmatic analogy holds true, since what really matt ers is the fact that both organs and tools, by being interchangeable, share the same signifi cance for the organism, regardless of their material constitution or physical collocation. Th ough an absolute or literal identity between sticks and eyes cannot be established, all authors seem thus to share the presumption that objects and instruments (in a word, technology) are exosomatic organs mediating between human body and outside world.
Such an interpretation already follows quite naturally from the observation that several living organisms other than man do use devices or means (terms to be preferred here to human tools or instruments, so as to keep the discourse on an analogical plane). As a fi rst example, the weaver ant (Oecophylla smaragdina) is an arboreal species whose adults are able to roll up leaves and piece them together by soft ly squeezing the larvae with their jaws, so that they release a drop of silk to be used as a kind of glue. Th us, "the ants then carry the larvae along the entire length of the leaf edges, squeezing as they go, using the larvae like living bott les of glue, until the edges of the leaves are stuck together from end to end" (Shuker 2001: 191) .
As a second example, the diving bell spider (Argyroneta aquatica) is a species that can live under water by building "diving bell" webs or air bubbles, anchoring them through silk threads to support materials like water plants, fi lling them with air and, eventually, using them as submarine houses where to eat, molt, mate and raise off spring. Th e overall apparatus allows a process of gas exchange (carbon dioxide with oxygen) that is driven by diff erences in partial pressure and water solubility of the components and serves as an underwater gill; in fact, the system has been referred to as a sort of 'aqualung' (Flynn, Bush 2008) .
Th e technological metaphors (glue and aqualung) used by scientists relate these behaviours to the case of the blind and the cane and suggest a specifi c sense of the concept of mediation between organisms and environment. By relying on the work of Arnold Gehlen about the essential connection between instruments and human body features, in his article on exosomatic organs Robert E. Innis states that the formers "can be analyzed under the threefold rubric of compensation, extension, and substitution" (Innis 1984: 68) . A hammer, for instance, extends the power of the hand for pounding and compensates for the relative fragility of human tissues and bones; similarly, wheels (and the apparatus they belong to) substitute feet and other locomotive structures, extend the distance that can be traversed and compensate for the limited speed achievable just through organic movement. In this respect, the performances of organs, non-human devices and tools can all be interpreted as extensive, substitutive and compensative actions.
To understand the assumptions underlying such a generalization, it can be assumed the schematic model of a living being proposed by Bateson (2009 Bateson ( [1951 ) as a minimal system consisting of a self-corrective internal causal circuit, acting on the environment and upon which the environment itself acts. External infl uences are perturbations of the systemic self-organization of the components (homeostasis) from which the entity is constituted; at the same time, the environment is a source of preservation for the living system and hence the latt er accomplishes several transformative operations on the former. It follows that coordination between internal and external processes of diff erent types is required and the institution of this correspondence is called by Bateson (2009 Bateson ( [1951 : 169) "codifi cation". Specifi cally, the congruence between inside and outside is pursued by the system through the att empt to operate (or act) on objects and events.
Th is understanding of the notion of action encompasses all the aforementioned examples: the reconnoitering movements of the eye and the stick are not passive processes, but active operations to collect information that, despite not actually changing the environment, are in any case meant to modify the relations between it and the organism, so as to fulfi ll its requirements; the percussion movements of the fi st and the hammer are transformations of the physical status of reality so as to make it congruent with internal needs; the foot and the wheel, the air bubble and the aqualung, the silk and the glue are all devices and instruments through which a certain kind of action -functional to the type of organism/environment congruence that is looked for -is made possible.
Besides, in his analysis Bateson maintains that, as for the organic model, the boundary between what can be said to belong to the self or the environment is arbitrary: "the organism includes within the self various objects and events outside its skin but intimately connected to him, while he labels as parts of the environment certain of his own body parts or functions" (Bateson 2009 (Bateson [1951 : 189; emphasis mine). Th is means that as long as certain elements, whether they be internal (endosomatic) or external (exosomatic), promote homeostasis, they can be defi ned as systemic or belonging to the set of perceptive-active operations of the living unity. Any component that is, to say, 'caught' in this net of relations and proves to be useful is subjected to an operation of meaning att ribution that selects some of its properties and makes it a part of a whole: it becomes thus functio nalized or re-functionalized, indeed something akin to the core of exaptation.
What was just said applies to the typology of exaptations articulated by Telmo Pievani (2003) . Whether the factor at stake is a constraining developmental path that encounters diff erential environmental conditions, or a single (or a set of) gene whose expression (protein) undergoes a change in time production or localization, or a whole organ that becomes useful for a new use because of ethological and ecological transformations, always the same occurs: a component is inserted in a new relational web, thereby becoming functional to the homeostatic working of a single system or a set of subsystems and, in turn, to the entire organism.
To conclude, this application of Bateson's perspective is, fi rst of all, a strong counter-argument to possible critiques directed against the recognition of similarities between organs and tools: if one adheres to a systemic view of living beings, the organic/inorganic dichotomy blurs (without considering the fact that the intra-corporeal exploitation of inorganic compounds is already a constitutive aspect of life as such). Secondly, tools and devices themselves, intentionally and naturally produced by means of selective and combinatory operations, seem to refl ect the very nature of the agents that make use of them, in a twofold sense: on one side, they enable them to perform actions, in this being 'active' like their utilizers; on the other side, they exhibit systemic properties, exactly as organisms do. Th irdly, since the whole reasoning is constitutively based on a broad interpretation of the concept of communication, it immediately takes on a quasi-semiotic dimension. Finally, the very terminology adopted ("pragmatic") is fully semiotic to the extent that the underlying argument consistently fi ts Peirce's pragmatic maxim, where the meaning of concepts (in our case, organs, devices and tools) consists in the practicalexperiential consequences they entail for the subject of action.
Functions and defi nitions of exaptations
In the previous analysis the notion of function has come to have a central role: organs and tools follow similar directions in the historical and structural process leading them to the acquisition of a general function of action towards the environment. Th is imposes a requirement on the modelling att empt, that is the adoption of an as general as possible schematization of what it means to perform a function, able to encompass satisfactorily both biological and technological instances.
Despite the fact that a "history of att empts by philosophers to clarify the notion of function exhibits all the strengths and weaknesses of this sort of undertaking" (Hull 1998: 223) , Larry Wright's article "Functions" (1973) is appropriate for a number of reasons: fi rstly, it has been considered to stand out as "seminal" (Hull 1998: 224) and hence is an authoritative reference; secondly, it explicitly off ers a unifying view on biological and technological functions; thirdly, the formula it proposes can be applied, with opportune modifi cations, to the types of exaptations described by Arnold; eventually, the distinction it draws between functionality and usefulness, by avoiding to directly call into question phenomena of adaptation, is well suited to some interpretations of Darwinism and parallels an almost identical critique in the context of evolutionary biology.
As for the last point, Wright complains about those accounts that fail to handle what he claims to be one of the most important distinctions to be concerned with when refl ecting on functions, namely accidental versus non-accidental situations. In his words: "Something can do something useful purely by accident, but […] something that I does by accident cannot be the function of I.
[…] Buckles stop bullets only by accident. Blowouts only accidentally keep us off doomed airplanes. Sweep hands only accidentally brush dust, if they do it at all" (Wright 1973: 147) .
Th e incapacity of some theories to embrace this distinction reminds of the dispute on the extension of such notions as adaptation and natural selection that sees the opposition between neo-and post-Darwinism, a debate from which exaptation itself derives. Th is similarity clearly appears from the following quotation:
Following Williams, we may designate as an adaptation any feature that promotes fi tness and was built by selection for its current role (criterion of historical genesis). Th e operation of an adaptation is its function. We may also follow Williams in labeling the operation of a useful character not built by selection for its current role as an eff ect.
[…] Adaptations have functions; exaptations have eff ect. (Gould, Vrba 1982: 6) Th e exaptive switch is the fi nal outcome of a process through which something, originally useful in some respect just accidentally (it is not a function, neither in Williams nor in Wright's sense), ends up taking on that usefulness as its own function, therewith turning an incident into the very reason of its maintenance. Hence, Wright's criticism is indirectly and negatively referring to mechanisms also at work in the production of exaptations.
Such a coincidence between analytic philosophy and evolutionary biology regards the examples adopted as well: as for Wright "it is absurd to say with Pangloss that the function of the human nose is to support eyeglasses" (Wright 1973: 148) , so for Gould and Richard C. Lewontin (Gould, Lewontin 1979: 581-585) "the adaptationist programme is truly Panglossian" because of "its failure to distinguish current utility from reasons for origin". Th ere is no proof that the latt ers got acquainted with the former; it might simply be that Voltaire did go at the heart of our cognitive att itude, touching a common epistemological issue. Whatever the case, Wright's article appears to be born out of similar problems and distinctions to those that later led to the precise identifi cation of exaptation.
Coming to the point, this is how the results of his analysis are summarized (Wright 1973: 161) :
Th e function of X is Z means (a) X is there because it does Z; (b) Z is a consequence (or result) of X's being there.
Th is formula is meant to represent a necessary and suffi cient condition for something to be a function and, by taking into account the past causal background of the phenomena under consideration, allows to rule out accidental instances. It includes both conscious and natural cases: "[t]he reason the sweep-secondhand is there is that it makes seconds easier to read. It is there because it does that". Moreover, "[w]e can say that the natural function of something -say, an organ in an organism -is the reason the organ is there by invoking natural selection.
[…] we can say animals have kidneys because they eliminate metabolic wastes from the bloodstream" (Wright 1973: 158-159) . Before modifying the formula so as to make it apt to defi ne what is not the consequence of selection and thus at the beginning merely fortuitous, a clarifi cation about the evolutionary connection between adaptation and exaptation is required. A character with a previous function (adaptation) can begin for a number of reasons to bring about accidental eff ects; when these, because of changes in the selective regime, become the grounds for its utility from that moment onwards, two things can happen: either the character undergoes modifi cations that transform it entirely and give rise to a secondary adaptation; or small (or not at all) subsequent refi nements occur, so that the character continues to be identifi able as basically the same, thereby acquiring the logical status of exaptation. Th e situation can be ambiguous and poses a problem of distinction: "[i]nevitably, there will be borderline cases where the term exaptation is hardly worth employing because the original trait has changed so much that it is scarcely recognizable" (Arnold 1994: 127) . Th at is, something can be both an adaptation and an exaptation simultaneously or one before the other sequentially.
Both aspects are acknowledged by Gould and Vrba: on one side, if an "aptation" is defi ned as the general phenomenon of being fi t, then "the set of aptations existing at any one time consists of two partially overlapping subsets: the subset of adaptations and the subset of exaptations" (Gould, Vrba 1982: 6) ; on the other side, when considering for instance the evolution of feathers and wings from dinosaurs to birds, "[w]e see, in this scenario, a sequential set of adaptations, each converted to an exaptation of diff erent eff ect that sets the basis for a subsequent adaptation" (Gould, Vrba 1982: 7) . Th e last point is implicitly contained in Wright's account as well: though "this analysis makes a clear and cogent distinction between function and accident", nevertheless "it is worth noting that something can get a function -either conscious or natural -as the result of an accident of this sort" and, in agreement with the words of Gould and Vrba, "that only disqualifi es an organ from functionhood for the fi rst -or the fi rst few -generations. If it survives by dint of its doing something, then that something becomes its function on this analysis" (Wright 1973: 165) .
However, even though one sequence (adaptation/exaptation/next adaptation) parallels the other (function/eff ect/next function), there is not a perfect coincidence: an exaptation (or eff ect, in Williams' terminology) is accidental just in respect to the previous selective regime that shaped the character and made it an adaptation; but it is not an accident at all insofar the new context of signifi cance is concerned, that cooperates in the production of the exaptation or eff ect by selecting functionally the old trait (and hence promoting fi tness), but with no further or substantial modifi cations of its shape (that is, diff erently from Wright, you have a function that is not an adaptation).
Th is said, to apply the original formula to Arnold's typology, fi rstly, it has to be considered valid to characterize functions as adaptations; secondly, its wording must be revised so as to refer to eff ects of unmodifi ed traits aft er the change of selective regime; thirdly, the temporal dimension needs to be properly signaled grammatically (simple present is substituted with present continuous, which implies a stronger conceptual diff erentiation from past events). Accordingly, the defi nition of a fi rstuse exaptation is the following:
Th e eff ect of X is Z means (a) X is there because it is doing Z; (b) X was not there because of Z; (c) Z is a consequence (or result) of X's being there.
[Sutures in the skulls of young birds and reptiles probably has arisen fr om the laws of growth, with no specifi c function, and only later where coopted because of their advantage in the parturition of higher mammals; example taken from C. R. Darwin and quoted in Gould, Vrba 1982: 5.] By accepting Wright's indication -"the notion of something having more than one function is derivative. It is obtained by substituting something like 'partly because' for 'because' in the formula" (Wright 1973: 166) -this is instead the defi nition of an extra-use addition exaptation in respect to the most recent usefulness:
Th e eff ect of X is Z (a) X is there partly because it is doing Z; (b) X is there partly because it does Y; (c) Z and Y are consequences (or results) of X's being there.
[Feathers began to allow birds to fl y fr om a certain historical moment onwards, but this eff ect did not supersede the previous function of thermoregulation; therefore, both thermoregulation and fl ying are now causes and consequences of their being there; example taken from Gould, Vrba 1982: 7.] Th e complete interchange between two subsequent utilities promoting fi tness, namely an extra-use transfer exaptation, can be fi nally expressed as follows:
Th e eff ect of X is Z means (a) X is there partly because it is doing Z; (b) Z is a consequence (or result) of X's being there; (c) X is there partly because it did Y; (d) Y was a consequence (or result) of X's being there.
[ For Wright's analysis has been pursued to come up with a unifying view, this classifi cation pertains also to technological-conscious phenomena of re-functionalization. Besides, further grounds for the construction of a general frame work are provided by his interpretation of the notion of selection. Aft er agreeing with the standard view, which identifi es selection with conscious choice, Wright claims that other uses of the notion can be understood as extensions of this defi nition, namely by "drawing att ention to specifi c individual features of the paradigm which occur in subconscious or nonconscious cases" (Wright 1973: 163) . Within the conscious cases, it is possible to distinguish between "mere discrimination" (selection without any apparent reason) and "consequenceselection" (selection by virtue of resultant advantage). In the latt er, "the consequence is the function" and "it is specifi cally this kind of selection of which natural selection represents an extension" (Wright 1973: 163) . Th e parallel Wright is drawing is the following (Wright 1973: 164) : just as in biological evolution, given the trait X, the causal consequence Z and the environment, X will be selected automatically (to be read not in a necessary-deterministic fashion, rather as absence of intentionality), so in our conscious behaviour, given the object X, the causal consequence Z and our criteria (corresponding to the 'human environment'), X will be selected automatically. Th us, "consequence-selection, by contrast with mere discrimination, de-emphasizes volition in just such a way as to blur its distinction from natural selection on precisely this point" (Wright 1973: 164) .
Two remarks are worth making. On the one hand, though Wright's theory accounts for functions and adaptations, it is applicable to exaptations as well once the addition or transfer performance, originally fortuitous, becomes the new consequence Z for which X is selected from that moment onwards according to a given environmental situation. On the other hand, despite Wright's intentions, the selecting process might have nothing to do with natural selection: both in biological evolution and technological development there actually happen cooptions of incidental consequences of traits and tools without substantial optimizing modifi cations of their features, hence not becoming adaptations, which on the contrary is by defi nition a process whereby "the average state of a character becomes improved with reference to a specifi c function" (Futuyma 2005: 544) .
Before turning to the conclusions, it must be noticed that if the consequence Z of an entity X is the cause of its selection -"Z must be or create conditions conducive to the survival or maintenance of X" (Wright 1973 : 164) -and any X, by performing diff erent actions, can take part into several connections, then any exaptation of X is defi nable as the selection of one or more causal consequences, induced by contextual variation, within a set of possible actions realizable by X. Since such a reading of the phenomenon discloses a systemic perspective, biosemiotics -the semiotic modelling of systemic relations -provides therefore an adequate theoretical framework for its treatment (Eder, Rembold 1992; Kull et al. 2008; Favareau 2010) .
Conclusions and research prospects
Th ree conclusions have been reached by the present research. Firstly, there exists an analogy of production between organs and tools. At least in some cases, they resemble each other in the way they originate and change, since both fulfi ll needs, exploit natural phenomena, arise through the combination of pre-existing elements and can undergo subsequent phases of functional shift and refi nement or improvement.
Secondly, there is a pragmatic analogy between organs, animal devices and human tools. In some instances all are means of mediation, to be understood as a compensative, extensive and substitutive action meant to transform favourably the set of relations established between a living subject and its environment. Above all, a communication-based approach to the topic blurs and eventually proves as misleading, if not totally wrong, such historical (and still on) distinctions as in/out, organic/inorganic, natural/artifi cial, and so forth (for the philosophical relevance of this theme, see postmodernism and cyborg theory, for instance Haraway 1991) 1 . Th irdly, the notion of function, implicitly operating throughout the twofold analogical comparison and essential to the very defi nition of exaptation, has been analysed from an analytic-philosophical perspective, where Wright's theory, able to unify natural and conscious functions, has allowed a defi nitional schematization of Arnold's classifi cation of exaptations. Th e resulting formulation of general types of functionalization (fi rst-use and extra-use) is both extendable to the technological dimension and developable into a semiotic typology of exaptations (for a biosemiotic notion of function, see for instance Emmeche 2002; cf. also Weible 2012) .
Besides, two notions (logically complementary) have been a background theme of the whole reasoning: on one side, the concept of selection runs in parallel to that of combination, since the consequence of a trait is selected on the basis of its arrangement with other elements; on the other side, both functionalization and re-functionalization are processes of the system to which the trait happens to start belonging.
As far as modelling is concerned, a further similarity is decisive at this point, since there exists another reality that, as much as technology and close to semiotics, behaves like a system, develops through selection and combination of already existing elements and performs actions. As a matt er of fact, several authors have thought of language as a technology:
Language -and its extensions in script and print -is, by reason of its fl exibility and refl exive structures, the most distinctive of all exosomatic organs.
[…] if we look closely enough we can see that the structure of embodiment relations used to explicate probes and canes […] perhaps applies also to language with a vengeance. (Innis 1984: 83) Consider a familiar tool or artifact, say a pair of scissors. Such an artifact typically exhibits a kind of double adaptation -a two-way fi t, both to the user and to the task. On the one hand, the shape of the scissors is remarkably well fi tt ed to the form and the manipulative capacities of the human hand. On the other hand (so to speak), the artifact, when it is in use, confers on the agent some characteristic powers or capacities which humans do not naturally possess: the ability to make neat straight cuts in certain papers and fabrics, the ability to open bubble packs, and so forth. Th is is obvious enough; why else would we value the artifact at all? Public language is in many ways the ultimate artifact. Not only does it confer on us added powers of communication; it also enables us to reshape a variety of diffi cult but important tasks into formats bett er suited to the basic computational capacities of the human brain. Just as scissors enable us to exploit our basic manipulative capacities to fulfi ll new ends, language enables us to exploit our basic cognitive capacities of patt ern recognition and transformation in ways that reach out to new behavioral and intellectual horizons. Moreover, public language may even exhibit the kind of double adaptation described above, and may hence constitute a body of linguistic artifacts whose form is itself in part evolved so as to exploit the contingencies and biases of human learning and recall. (Clark 1998: 193-194) According to the previous conclusions, language can thus be considered ana logically both as an organ and a tool and the work of Lass (1990; 1997) in particular off ers an appropriate conceptual apparatus to this comparative approach.
First of all, from the methodological viewpoint, he repeatedly stresses how the relation between organisms and languages must be properly understood: " [I] t is important to note that by comparing X and Y as terms of an analogy I am not saying that X=Y. […] by saying that much of the methodology of historical linguistics is 'like' that of geology or evolutionary biology, one is not saying that languages are rocks or organisms" (Lass 1997: 293, fn 10) . Hence, "on the tack I take here, the consilience is with what we know of the behavior of a large class of non-linguistic system types" (Lass 1997: 384 ; emphasis mine).
Secondly, he refers to examples, theories and metaphors taken from evolutionary biology and, particularly, from Gould himself. For instance, as the giant panda, at some point of his evolution, lost the digit corresponding to our thumb (Gould 1980 ) and later on co-opted another forelimb bone to make a new thumb -that is "[t]ypes of change can and do recur, and old types of objects (if in diff erent shapes) may re-emerge" (Lass 1997: 298) -so "[l] ong-term cycles of change are familiar from the histories of many (I would suspect most) languages" (Lass 1997: 298) . Similarly, in languages there happens something "not dissimilar to the picture of 'punctuated equilibrium' suggested by Eldredge & Gould (1972) […]; evolution in their (controversial but arguable) view is not steady change, but shows stasis as a background, with fairly short bursts of dramatic speciation activity at odd intervals […] . I think the evidence in the case of languages is as good as it can be" (Lass 1997: 304) 2 . Eventually, just as "natural systems like the genomes contain enormous amounts of non-functional material" (Lass 1997: 313-314) and this "non-expressed variability may eventually serve as a reservoir for evolutionary change", so "[t]he same seems to be true of linguistic junk" (Lass 1997: 314-315) .
Th irdly and above all, languages do evolve by means of exaptations. Among Lass' examples (Lass 1997: 317-318) there are the development of the Germanic strong verb (when late Western Indo-European lost its aspect system, the old perfect and aorist morphophonology were redeployed as a marker of number) and, in English, the old number opposition "you" vs. "thou", that was pragmatically exapted to distinguish between an unmarked and an 'aff ective' pronoun. Moreover, grammaticization and new grammatical categories can occur and develop through new functional co-options, as for instance in the development of grammaticized aspects in Germanic or the rise of marked progressive aspect in English (further references thereupon are Lass 1990; Traugott 2004; Fanego 2004; Narrog 2007) .
Lass' understanding of language change, founded on the images and terms of complexity, chaos and systems theories ("phase-space", "epigenetic landscapes", "att ractors", "chreods", and so on; cf. Lass 1997: 293-303 ; for a description of his model, Lass 370-383), provides a very comprehensive framework which it is worth working on: I am convinced […] that there is such a thing as a theory of 'historically evolved systems' , and that virtually any such system that meets certain criteria is going to show phenomena that look like junk-deposition. In other words, human cultural evolution (or the evolution of human cultural artifacts, which is almost certainly not the same thing), like the evolution of biological systems, is based at least partly on bricolage, cobbling, jerry-building, whatever you want to call it; pieces of such systems are always falling off and if not lost are recycled, oft en in amazingly original and clever ways. (Lass 1998: 316; emphases mine) 
